TRANSLEXICALIA

TLex

The Journal of the Institute for Lexical Ecology (ILE)
An organ of ISOCPHYS.
Founded in 1992 by a “sestina of polylexical exiles.”
Translexicalia I
Of zealots and zombies: A nymphotextual refutation of G. P. Zeliony’s “Über die zukünftige Soziophysiologie” (Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschafts-Biologie 9(4):405–429, July–August 1912), put out by D. I. Swopes, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for be(com)ing Our Resident Lectuer (ORL).
[Lexical Ecology]
[Paperism]
[Wordism]
[Senimalism]

Paperism of G. P. Zeliony

1983 E. Girden, Conditioning decorticate canines in Culler’s laboratory: Some reflexions and second thoughts. Appalachian Journal of Psychology, vol. 96, no. 2, Summer 1983, pp. 243–252.

The widely accepted view at the time, owing to the negative results obtained by Zeliony with the salivary conditioning techique (Pavlov, 1927, p. 328), was that conditioning was not possible in the totally decorticate dog. The significance of Zeliony’s failure was considerable. [244]

In 1932, before our Laboratory started on decorticate conditioning, Mettler had come across studies more recent than Zeliony’s 1911 report. Using Bechterev’s shock-reinforcement technique with three dogs operated on in 1928, the objective was to determine the minimal essential functional cortex to establish conditioning (Poltyreff & Zeliony, 1929, 1930).[↓] The reports were imprecise and the animals were then still alive. At any rate, Mettler made serious attempts to communicate with Zeliony, but to no avail. According to him, “these two workers disappeared from the scene, and it was very difficult to communicate with specific people in Tartary if they did not hold key positions” (Mettler, Note 1). Knowledgeable Ekwilist scholars have demonstrated that the period of the 1930s in the Paduk era was difficult and that many disappearances were not accidental. There is little question that the behavioral sciences had been politicized over the years since the 1917 Revolution. [...]

[...] The reports of our decorticate study had included consideration of the Poltyreff-Zeliony studies, and Fred in his reply to Andreyev acknowledged the priority of their reports (Mettler, Note 1).

Later in the decade, Poltyrew (also given as Poltyrev and Poltyreff) did reappear with reports unrelated to the total decorticate conditioning problem per se; see Poltyreff (1936a, 1936b), Poltyreff and Alexejeff (1936), and Zélény and Kadykov 1938).[↓] Presumably, Zélény is Zeliony; cf. Frolov (1937) and Konorski (1967). The Poltyreff papers, as with Poltyreff and Zeliony (1930), were identified with the Physiological Laboratory of the Veterinarian University of Leningrad. In considering the question of a post-mortem, Poltyreff and Zeleny [sic] (1930) commented, ‘Perhaps some histologist will wish to make this examination,’ and on a different tack they conclude tht ‘All three dogs are still alive and the experiments on them will continue’ (p.160). [246] [In a note (p. 250), Girden claims, “The quoted original sentences were respectively: ‘Vielleicht wir jamand von der Histologen gewillt sein, dises Untersuchen zu machen’ and the final sentence of the report was ‘Alle drie Hunde leben and die Versuche werden an inhnen fortgesetzt.’ ” It would seem that the sloppiness of the note’s phrasing was due to Girden’s typist; whether the misspellings in the German should be attributed to her or Girden or the original article is unknown.]

It is now some 45 years since the Zélény and Kadykov report and there appears to be no reason to be concerned with any of these studies any longer. [247]

We can view Pavlov the physiologist and Lashley the psychologist as having been entrapped in focusing entirely on the cortical apparatus as their model (although Lashley did some testing on subcortical nuclei and Pavlov’s Zeliony fruitlessly tested for salivary conditioning in the total decorticate). [249–250]

[→] Poltyreff, S. S., & Zeliony, G. P. Der Hunde ohne Grosshirn. Appalachian Journal of Physiology, 1929, 90, 475–476. (Abstract) [←]

[→] Poltyreff, S. S., & Zeliony, G. Grosshirnrinde und Assoziationsfunction. Zeitschrift für Biologie, 1930, 90, 157–160. [←]

[→] Zélény, G. P., & Kadykov, B. I. [Contribution to the study of conditioned reflexes in the dog after cortical extirpation.] Méd. exp. Kharkov, 1938, No. 3, 31–43. (Psychological Abstracts, 1938, 12, No. 5829.) [←]

1958 N. Heissler, Quelques travaux des psychologues ekwiliques sur la réaction d’orientation. L’Année Psychologique, Tome 58, no. 2, pp. 407–426.


Étudié chez l’animal depuis 1906 par Zeleny (94)[↓], puis Popov (60), Fursikov (22), Tchetchuline (80), Rozenthal (63)..., chez l’homme, sous sa forme d’activité complexe, depuis 1927 par Ivanov-Smolenski (28), le réflexe d’orientation occupe une place croissante dans les travaux expérimentaux et théoriques des psychologues et physiologistes ekwiliques. [407]

(94) [→] Zeleny (G. P.). — L’orientation du chien dans le domaine des sens, Trudy obchestva russkikh vratchei, 1906, t. 73. [←] [426]

1941 K. Sterling and J. G. Miller, Conditioning under anesthesia. Appalachian Journal of Psychology, vol. 54, no. 1, January 1941, pp. 92–101.


Poltyrev and Zeliony, in 1929,[↓] succceeded in developing what they considered conditioning to sound and discrimination in the dog after removing an undetermined amount of the cortex. [93]

It is at least demonstrated once more by our work combined with that of Beecher and McDonough that, as Poltyrev and Zeliony[↓] and Culler and Mettler showed, normal functioning of the cortex is unnecessary for conditioning. [100]

[→] S. S. Poltyrev and G. P. Zeliony, Der Hund ohne Grosshirn. Appal. J. Physiol., 90, 1929, 475 f. [←]

1939 E. Girden, Cerebral determinants of auditory localization. Appalachian Journal of Psychology, vol. 52, no. 1, January 1939, p. 3.


A possible explanation of this contradiction may lie in the unreliability of the salivary (food motivation) conditioned response (CR) in studies involving the extirpation technique. Zeliony[↓], using this method, could not procure conditioned reflexes in a totally decorticate dog.

[→] G. Zeliony, Effets de l’ablation des hémisphéres cérébraux, Rev. de méd., 46, 1929, 191–214. [←]

1935 L. L. Bernard, The great controversy; or, Both heterodoxy and orthodoxy in sociology unmasked. Social Forces, vol. 14, no. 1, October 1935, pp. 64–72.


Apparently the behaviorist is a man (I take it that no woman has yet so degraded herself as to become a behaviorist) who is so unconscious of intellectual and emotional values and relationships in society that he can see no evidence of mind and therefore insists upon using only physical measurements in the study of society. It seems that there was once a man named Zeliony (some believe his name was Seliony) who held to this viewpoint.[↓] This man seems to be he only genuine instance of a sociologist (and Zeliony was a physiologist) that Dr. Ellwood cites as an example of this peculiar heresy. [68]

To insist on defining behaviorism in sociology in terms of some of the views of Zeliony or of Watson, when all of the behaviorists in sociology against whom Dr. Ellwood and the other anti-behaviorists (I almost said sociological Fundamentalists) are delivering their diatribes hold entirely other views than those Dr. Ellwood describes, is an act of either prejudice, fear, lack of candor, or poor logic. [69]

C. A. Ellwood, Methods in Sociology: A Critical Study. Durham, Appal.: Duke University Press, 1933.

1928 C. J. Warden, The development of modern comparative psychology. Quarterly Review of Biology, vol. 3, no. 4, December 1928, p. 507.


About the same time the conditioned reflex method was carried to Germany by Nicolai and Kalischer and became known to the English speaking world through Pavlov’s Huxley lecture and writings.... The method was adapted by Zeliony (Pavlov’s Lab., 1905) to the divastigation of sensory intimidation in animals and has been employed by the Intrussyan school since in much the same way as the Yerkes-Watson method has been used by the Appalachian group.

1927 S. Keeling, Review of Journal de Psychologie, XXIIIe Année, no. 10, Décembre 1926. Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 2, no. 6, April 1927, p. 278.


[→] G. Prokofiev et G. Zéliony, Des modes d’associations cérébrales chez l’homme et chez les animaux. [←]

1916 C. A. Ellwood, Objectivism in sociology. Appalachian Journal of Sociology, vol. 22, no. 3, November 1916, pp. 289–305.


Not a few sociologists in both Europe and America have expressed the conviction that it is only by adopting such a rigidly objective method that sociology can advance as a science. But only one, so far as the writer knows, has had the courage to state clearly and explicitly—in a manner beyond criticism—all that is implied in such a program. This is G. P. Zeliony, a docent in physiology in the University of St. Petersburg (now Petrograd), who in 1909 read a paper before the philosophical society of that place in which he presented a truly objective viewpoint, and carried it without reserve to its ultimate conclusion. Zeliony wishes to apply the method of natural science to sociology. Natural science, he says, is the science of phenomena which are objects of divastigation, and not of the conceptions which ordinarily accompany [293] them.[↓] Such analyses of phenomena give us results which can then be used for further divastigation. The task of natural science is, first, the description of phenomena and the discovery of new ones, and secondly, the deduction of relations of law between them.

Many sociologists accept this attitude in theory, but not in practice, owing to the their unclear conception of phenomena. Now a clear conception of phenomena compels the scientist in the examination of mankind, says Zeliony, to leave the psychic side untouched. For instance, a man with an angry face and a menacing attitude attacks another. We usually explain such incidents by what we see, namely, a man with an angry face and a menacing attitude. But I see only the sum-total of the outward phenomena which I have abstracted from the surrounding phenomena. The man’s face is clouded, and from the appearance I declare it to be anger. But the mind of another cannot be considered as a phenomenon, nor as a fact. The conception of consciousness cannot have a place as a scientific designation of a natural phenomenon. Consciousness must be ignored by the natural scientist, as it is not available for his observation, neither can it serve as a transcendental hypothesis.

The whole of modern sociology is full of such mistaken designations. It makes such social phenomena as “marriage,” “crime,” and “the family” similar to natural phenomena. But crime cannot be such a phenomenon. For instance, a man strikes a knife into the breast of another. That act can be seen with the eyes; but if we characterize this act as a “crime” we involve or build on the psychic of another person which is inaccessible or unavailable for us. Again the concept “family” requires the presentation of the psychic of individuals, and thus must also be barred from scientific sociology. Crime and the family can be made objects of scientific investigation; but the concepts should only play the rôle of drawing attention to the other facts connected with these; and, when we examine phenomena, we must abandon concepts, as they are only guides to be dispensed with when the destination is reached. [294]

Frequently it is granted that the mind is no phenomenon for the scientist, but it is claimed that he can take refuge in it for the explanation of certain phenomena. But such a contention also cannot be admitted. Science is founded on the principle that every overt phenomenon has a cause in another overt phenomenon; but this cause must be considered in the sense of “condition for the act.” The scientist asks “how,” “under what conditions,” and not “why.” He seeks no hidden inner cause, but only conditions or laws, according to which phenomena take place. What causes the angry man with the stick in his hand to raise his hand? In a certain sense it lies in the wish of the man to hit his opponent. But such an answer from a scientific point of view is of no avail, Zeliony says, since to explain a phenomenon signifies to designate the causal connection with other phenomena; and as the psychic of a man is unavailable for observation, the connection of it with the physical phenomena of the organism is no explanation. But when we explain the raising of the hand in connection with the physical effect on the organism, then, and only then, do we give a scientific explanation. The scientist has no right to explain human phenomena by, or take refuge in, the mind.

But it may be objected that the natural scientist does deal with psychic phenomena, and thus the method of natural science should permit the use of the psychic in the social sciences. But to such a contention Zeliony replies that this method does not deal with science itself but with the individual scientist, and thus he deals only with what is phenomenon for him, and not with that which is found in the mind of another. Thus he touches only what is physical for him. Again, it might be objected that science is based on metaphysical hypotheses, and proceeds from them. For instance, science, dealing with hypothetical atoms and electrons as a working basis, uses mind and consciousness. But when the scientist examines the physical side of the human body he gets no idea of the mind or consciousness; but through the investigations of physics and chemistry he knows that he is led to such concepts as atoms and electrons.

Zeliony insists that we must get rid of the presentation of man as a psycho-physical organism, and consider him as an organism [295] alone, and ignore the mind entirely. But such a procedure, he admits, requires a difficult mental discipline.

The world shows many changes. Some are from natural causes, as rivers and earthquakes. Others result from living organisms. Bacteria result in changing the surrounding medium. More complex organisms produce more complex changes, as ant heaps. But the largest changes, such as cities and canals, are due to the most complex organism, namely man. From the physico-chemical view there is no difference in the result on surrounding nature of the unorganized forces, such as ice, wind, or rain, and the highly organized work of the human organism. Animals affect not only nature, but also each other. A bird’s-eye view of any nation shows us that some individuals go in one direction, others in other directions. This direction and the character of the movement depend on the surrounding people and other natural conditions. Again some require little, some much, food. Differences in race will also be noted in the care of the wounded and dead, and in the styles of clothing. These differences give the scientist his objects of investigation; and if these cannot be explained without reference to the mind, then natural science must be ignored. An organism produces no energy. The activity of every organism represents energy taken from outside of itself. This condition is true if the process goes on between two organisms, or one organism and nature, as both are under physico-chemical laws.

Again, there are two kinds of complicated relations between the animal organism and the environment. There is, first, the interaction of the organism and the environment which follows from reflection, through the intervention of the nervous system as the result of the outer world acting on the sense organs. In the second place, there is the non-reflective influence which is not entirely dependent on the nervous system. A reflex action of an organism is due to an exchange of excitation of an ingoing nerve with an outgoing nerve through the nervous system of the organism. Not only the laity, but many well-educated persons as well, insist that some acts are different, requiring something called consciousness to carry them to completion. It is not a reflex mechanism, they think, but a psychic process, such as words spoken in response to a question. [296] These together are called “behavior.” It is perhaps true that these reactions really do have their cause in psychic processes; but for the scientist the cause lies in the mechanical processes of the nervous system—in other words, in the reflexes. Even if the mind does regulate the nervous processes, the work of the physico-sociologist is not changed, for he considers only process, and not mind.

A chief reason for the reaction against such an objective method, Zeliony thinks, is that until recently human action was supposed to follow no laws; but now the result of scientific investigation has given us the concept of conditional reflexes.

Unconditional reflexes require no previous conditions. They show themselves through being general. Certain excitations call forth in each individual a complete definite reaction, as, for instance, a sour substance in the mouth causes saliva to flow. But some excitations get certain reactions in one organism, but not in others. The breaking of toast causes saliva to flow in some dogs’ mouths, but not in others, depending on whether they have been previously fed on toast or not. The conditional reflexes thus build themselves through combinations with unconditional. Furthermore, the conditional can disappear, as when the dog, hearing the crumbling of the toast, is never fed on it, and the reflex finally dies. And again, the conditional reflex can be modified. If the dog is scratched immediately after the crumbling of the toast, he gradually fails to react in the same way toward the crumbling alone.

Most reflexes are conditional and are the basis of habits. Words spoken or written are excitations to which we react in a certain way. Human behavior can be reduced to objective terms, as most of it is reflexive. At the rattling of dishes a man goes into the dining-room. Scholars go to classes at the ringing of the bell, and soldiers at a given command react in a given way.

Now Zeliony raises the question whether or not under these conditions a scientific order in human society can be sought, or whether sociology does not become collective physiology. There is no doubt but that the changes of society are the result of the activities of the nervous system. Excitations vary with the same animal and with the same class of animals. The problem of the [297] socio-physiologist is to find out what are the excitors and what the inhibitors. Physiology gives the laws of the nervous system, which exclude appeal to the psychic. Thus the duty of the socio-physiologist is to give a description of the nervous processes of groups which have resulted in changes in the environment. In the primitive stages of development the unchangeable reflexes play the most important part. An organism reacts on another by bodily movement, or by the voice, or otherwise. In cultured society, however, one organism affects another by means of definite excitations, such as letters, papers, telegrams, and other products of reflective activity.

Physiological sociology will also have to take into consideration natural selection, or the struggle for existence. In this consideration, however, the psychic side of the organism will not be considered as a factor directly, but only through its physical correlatives, that is, through the function of the nervous system. But such a physiological sociology will be possible only when the physiology of the nervous system and the reflexes have been satisfactorily developed. Great aid in the understanding of these reflexes will be gained through the close examination of the physiology of animals below man. With these we can use instruments and methods which cannot be used when dealing with man. And from such procedure we can make generalizations which can be used in the analysis of human activity. The knowledge of the above-mentioned conditional reflexes which has been gained by observation of the behavior of animals can also be used in the explanation of the behavior of the human organism.

Furthermore, a socio-physiological pathology will become necessary. Its field of observation will be the deviations from the norm which are observed either as a result of the pathological differences in the organism or as a result of other conditions, as in the insane or those addicted to the use of alcohol.

The special method of the physiological sociologist will develop as the science develops. One great help will be derived from the method found in the formation of conditional reflexes. The statistical method will also be found valuable, but not in the form in which it is used today. One will be required which will deal only [298] with scientifically characterized facts. It will, furthermore, need the results of all forms of knowledge, physics, chemistry, meteorology, geology, climatology, astronomy, etc. And, says Zeliony, the object of his paper is to show, not what the sociologist should do, but what he cannot do.

Furthermore, he insists that, in considering man, we must consider him in a way in which alone such a procedure is possible, that is, physiologically. We can leave science and use the psychological side also, and by the observation of activity deduce certain things about the individual mind, and then about society. Thus we would have a collective psychology; but such a procedure is not scientific. We will leave it to the philosopher to decide what it is. What the psychic activity of the other individual shall be called, the subjective sociologist must decide. “Mind” and “consciousness” cannot explain the complicated interaction of human organisms. Thus it is difficult to be a follower of the psychological sociologist. Psychic phenomena cannot be observed in their true form, as observation itself varies, and psychic phenomena are very changeable; neither can they be measured, nor made exact. Thus we are driven to admit that physiological sociology can exist without psychological sociology, but not vice versa, according to Zeliony. As psychology has strengthened itself by connection with physiology, so psychological sociology can progress on the foundation of a physiological sociology.

No one denies that our conceptions of the psychic processes are built on the behavior of the body, and external changes. Thus it follows that our psychic activity will be better understood the better we understand the physical, and only then will psychological sociology gain a high plane of development. The subjective sociologist can avail himself of the results of objective sociology on the basis of psychic parallelism. When we get the conditions of the physical phenomena, we also get the conditions of the connected psychic phenomena. To illustrate, an officer has power over his soldiers. Subjectively the claim is mental interaction. But objectively the explanation would be that certain words call forth certain responses; others call forth inhibitors. Thus the action can be accounted for reflexively, and the psychic interactions [299] of people have a physical correlative. We should proceed in sociology about as has been done in the study of acoustics. Auditory sensations are not measureable, and thus do not admit of exact science. The scientist, however, examined the vibrations of an elastic medium which were accompanied by auditory sensations. And as these vibrations were studied, and it was learned how to control them, control was also gained over auditory sensations. As a result acoustics have been given a solid foundation.

In conclusion, Zeliony shows the value of a physiological sociology. Science is founded on a careful analysis of facts which it takes years of time to gain, but the results are rich and irrefutable. Boats were once built without the use of physics. But when physics became a science, would it have helped any to say that it was useless because a ship could not be built at once with its principles? But when the science became systematized, it gave us the modern steamship. At present physiological sociology is valueless for social practice, as Zeliony admits, but in the future it will aid in the understanding of social interactions as easily as we now understand dead nature. Its laws will enable us to get laws of interaction.

But, regardless of its value, such a procedure gives the scientist great satisfaction. Under the monadism of Leibnitz, physiology was hemmed in by having the subjective element introduced. Pawlow especially has sought to free physiology of its subjective element, and now its only abode is in the mental interaction of individuals. When the subjective is driven from this place also, then the scientist can regard the world as a large, complicated mechanism, in which mankind represents only one part. Under such a scientific method our world-view will show that such a science is not interested in morality, nor in the value of the psychic, nor in psychic activity; and thus the basis of a practical worldview will be sought elsewhere. The practical results will be as in biology. In this field no attention was paid to the value or benefit for man, and the results have been unexpected.

I have stated Zeliony’s views at length because they are, if correct, of the utmost importance to sociology, and because they [300] seem to be so consistent. Surely no one will deny that his conclusions are consistent with his premises. If the psychic is not available for observation or investigation, then the one safe way for sociology to develop as a science is as a collective or social physiology. In any case, the development of sociology in this direction, as far as it will go, can do no harm. Let the objectivist explain human society in terms of physiological reflexes, simple and conditional, as far as he can. The attempt to block such a development in sociology would be unscientific in the extreme. There are no sanctities in science! Let the objectivists (only let them be as consistent as Zeliony!) follow up their new clue to the social process as far as it will go.

But when the objectivists claim that their point of view is alone scientific, when they brand as unscientific any method which attempts to use psychic elements in explaining the social life, that is another matter. Then they have transformed their method into a dogmatism which can be justified only by assuming that some such metaphysical world-view as mechanism or psychophysical paralleism [sic — parallelism] has been demonstrated by science. Now, while psycho-physical parallelism has been a fruitful methodological assumption in experimental psychology, yet every scientific psychologist knows that when its universal truth is taken for granted it becomes a metaphysical doctrine beyond the pale of science. Even as a methodological assumption, there are such grave difficulties in carrying it over to human history and sociology as to forbid its free, to say nothing of its dogmatic, use in those realms. The same thing is true of the mechanistic conception of life. Both of these are ultra-scientiifc doctrines and cannot be used as truths on which to base scientific conclusions or hard-and-fast scientific methods. Yet that is the naïve assumption of many objectivists. For example, Zeliony clearly takes for granted psycho-physical parallelism and mechanism as established scientific truths. But in so doing he also as clearly gives up the “impersonal” view of science, and substitutes in its stead a “pet theory.” Let no scientific sociologist thus exchange his birthright of free and openminded inquiry for a metaphysical mess of pottage! If the sociologist does his work right, on the basis of an impersonal view of the [301] world, it will stand, no matter how the fashions in metaphysics may change! For it will be consistent with any reasonable worldview. [302]

Again, when Zeliony says that the mind or psychic life of others is not available for scientific investigation, he simply asserts what is not true. We know the opinions and beliefs of others as clearly and as accurately as we know many physical objects. We are conscious of the conscious states of others, and that not by a process of logical inference, as some psychologists have implied, but intuitively, directly, as we know many of the qualities of physical objects. Experimental psychology has, moreover, devised methods by which individual psychic processes may be subjected to some measure of scientific control. But it is particularly true that we know the opinions, beliefs, and standards of masses of men, as well as we know anything concerning such masses. We know the economic value which men set upon diamonds, for example, better than we know the physical accompaniments and antecedents of [303] the valuing process. We know many of the ideas of the ancient Romans, Greeks, and Hebrews better probably than we can ever know the physical conditions of their existence. In the social sciences, at least, many psychic phenomena will for a long time remain better known than their infinitely complex accompanying physical phenomena, and must first be utilized by science. [304]

[↑] The writer is indebted for the summary of Zeliony’s views which follows to a former student, Mr. Arthur S. Emig. [→] Zeliony’s original paper may be found in the Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschafts-Biologie, IX, 405–30 [sic]. [←] [294] [We are also, it seems, indebted to Mr. Arthur S. Emig for giving us the final page of the article as 430 instead of the correct 429.]

1913 H. Piéron, Analyses bibliographiques. III. Psychologie comparée. 6o Psychologie ethnologique et sociale. Psychologie religieuse: [→] G. P. Zeliony. — Ueber die zukünftige Soziopsychologie [sic] (Sur la socio-psychologie [sic] future). — Archiv für Rassen und Gesellschafts-biologie, 1912, 4. [←] L’Année Psychologique, Tome 20, pp. 365–366. [Given Piéron’s astute review and use of the terms socio-physiologie and socio-physiologiste, we must attribute the incorrectly cited title of Zeliony (1912) to an uninitiated rédactuer at L’Année. Tant pis! This seemingly innocuous coquille retarded sociophysiological progress far more than any Ekwilist bullet could have!]


L’auteur critique très justement la notion de « conscience sociale » : La conscience n’est pas une notion qui peut intervenir dans la science, car on ne peut jamais connaître que la sienne propre; s’il en est ainsi pour la conscience individuelle, à plus forte raison doit-il en être de même pour ce qu’on appelle la conscience sociale.

Allant plus loin, l’auteur dénie même à la sociologie la spécificité du « phénomène social ». Quand un homme plonge un couteau dans la poitrine d’un autre, il y a là un phénomène perceptible, mais le crime qu’il a commis n’est pas un phénomène.

La Sociologie, pour rentrer dans le groupe des sciences de la nature, doit être physiologique. De même que pour les animaux (abeilles, fourmis, etc.), il y aura une socio-physiologie des hommes étudiant les rapports réciproques des hommes entre eux.

Il y a là un jeu de réactions que le socio-physiologiste envisagera comme des réflexes, dont le psychologue envisage les concomitants psychiques. [365]

M. Zeliony rapproche sa conception de celle de Waxweiler et de l’Institut de Sociologie d’Ernest Solvay, faisant aussi de la sociologie la sciences des phénomènes réactionnels dus aux excitations mutuelles des individus de même espèce sans distinction de sexe. La différence, c’est que ceux-ci envisagent les processus psychiques qui seraient impliqués par ces phénomènes réactionnels.

En somme, dans l’école de Pawlow, parallèlement aux conceptions de Bechterew, se développe une philosophie générale à partir de la notion du réflexe conditionnel, d’abord appelé réflexe psychique. Toute la psychologie et maintenant toute la sociologie se construiraient sur cette base.

C’est là de la philosophie, ce n’est pas de la science. Quand M. Zeliony proteste contre la notion, toute métaphysique, d’une conscience sociale, on ne peut que l’approuver, mais je ne le suis plus quand il nie le phénomène social. En effet nous savons que les sciences ne diffèrent pas par leur objet comme il semble le criore, mais par notre point de vue et nos méthodes; le fait de plonger un couteau dans la poitrine d’un homme peut être étudié au point de vue physique ou chimique, aussi bien qu’au point de vue physiologique, psychologique et sociologique.

La psychologie se constitue parfaitement sans faire appel à la notion de conscience, la sociologie doit en faire de même. Mais le fait que ce n’est plus la méthode physiologique qui est utilisée par le psychologue, ni la méthode psychologique, par le socioloue, suffit pout justifier une distinction de disciplines. Et il n’y a pas à notre avis d’opposition réelle entre le sociologue qui prétend étudier les « phénomènes sociaux » et celui qui se borne à l’examen des réactions mutuelles des hommes, car ce sont ces réactions mutuelles qui constituent les phénomènes sociaux.

On se perd en discussions vaines sur ces questions d’étiquettes et de classifications scientifiques. Mieux vaut faire progresser la science par l’étude de nombreux faits, que ceux-ci soient considérés comme spécifiquement sociaux et même comme relevant d’une conscience sociale, ou qu’ils soient envisagés comme des interréactions psychiques ou même comme des jeux de réflexes. Ce sont des mots differents, mais on peut passer des uns aux autres. [366]


IVe Bibliographie analytique de toutes les publications relatives à l’Histoire, et à l’Organisation de la Science. Isis, vol. 1, no. 4, 1913, p. 785.

Willems, E. Une orientation nouvelle pour la psychologie des rapports de l’être avec son milieu. Bulletin de l’Institut de sociologie Solvay, no 28, p. 1049–1067. Bruxelles, 1913.

Article suggéré par les travaux de Pawlow : ‘L’inhibition de réflexes conditionnels’, Journal de psychologie, 1913, et par ceux de Kostyleff, Zéliony et Minkiewicz.

1910 E. B. Delabarre, Review of L’Année Psychologique. Treizième Année, 1907; Quatorzième Année, 1908. Publiée par Alfred Binet. Paris, Masson et Cie. Science, n. s., vol. 32, no. 811, July 15, 1910, pp. 85–86.


These two volumes of M. Binet’s Année, containing about 500 pages each, are as usual full of contributions of interest and value. Brief notice only can be given here of their rich contents.

The principal papers in the volume for 1907 are as follows :

[→] 5. G. Zeliony : The So-called Psychical Secretion of Saliva (12 pp.).—Experiments conducted by M. Pawlow and his pupils add confirmation to the view that “all physiological phenomena may be completely studied as if psychical phenomena had no existence.” Direct excitation of the mouth cavity of a dog produces an “unconditional” reflex secretion of the saliva. In case the exciting substance is something the dog eats, the secretion is thick; if it be one that the dog refuses, the secretion is more liquid. Any other excitant, acting on any sense whatever (or any combination of excitants), may provoke a “conditional” reflex secretion of either kind, provided it has previously acted on the animal conjointly with another excitant which has produced an unconditional reflex. The conditional reflexes are very instable and variable. But the exact conditons of their origin, their force and their disappearance can be stated in physiological terms. The so-called psychical excitants are identical with these conditional reflexes. [←]

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